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ABSTRACT  
 
The U.S. federal government spends huge sums buying goods and services from outside of the public sector. 
Given the sums involved, strategic government purchasing can have electoral consequences. In this paper, we 
suggest that more politicized agencies show favoritism to entrepreneurs in key electoral constituencies and to 
firms connected to political parties. We evaluate these claims using new data on United States government 
contracts between 2003 and 2015. We find that executive departments, particularly more politicized 
department-wide offices, are the most likely to have contracts characterized by non-competitive procedures 
and outcomes, indicating favoritism. Politically responsive agencies – but only those – give out more non-
competitive contracts in battleground states. We also observe greater turnover in firms receiving government 
contracts after party change in the White House, but only in the more politicized agencies. We conclude that 
agency designs that limit appointee representation in procurement decisions reduce political favoritism. 
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Governments in developed countries like the United States spend over one quarter of their budget 
buying goods and services from suppliers outside the public sector, with contracts typically set up between 
agencies and private firms (OECD 2017).1 The United States federal government spends $350 billion per year 
on procurement in the Department of Defense alone. This is greater than half the entire domestic 
discretionary budget in a given year, and provides the president and his administration with a powerful 
political vehicle (Gitterman 2013). Although the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) prescribes open 
competition for government contracts, this paper explains that there are ways for agencies to circumvent the 
spirit of the law, which opens up avenues for politically motivated favoritism in procurement. And, indeed, 
there are clear signs of non-competitive procedures and outcomes, with about 35 percent of federal contracts 
showing such features.  
Politically motivated favoritism exists in situations where the procurer deliberately sets competition 
aside for electoral reasons, to cultivate relationships with connected firms, or in other ways allow the 
incentives of the party in power to influence the procurement process. The opportunities to engage in 
favoritism are shaped by federal law and vary across agency contexts. Many agencies spend significant 
amounts on goods and services. For others, procurement rarely factors in to their work. Agency design, 
particularly how responsive an agency is to the president, also varies significantly (O’Connell 2014; Selin 
2015). Some agencies have a large appointee presence and others operate largely insulated from electoral 
politics (Lewis 2008). Within agencies, the context changes as procurement choices come and go, as do teams 
of administration appointees. Put very simply, we suggest that the risks for politically motivated favoritism are 
higher in more politicized agencies.   
There is a large literature on distributive politics in the United States that connects electoral 
geography to the distribution of federal funds (see, e.g., Berry and Fowler 2016; Berry, Burden and Howell 
2010; Bertelli and Grose 2009; Ting 2012). This literature sometimes draws attention to the role played by 
political appointees in distribution decisions and hints at politically motivated favoritism (Berry and Gersen 
2017; Hudak 2014; Kriner and Reeves 2015). By and large, however, this work frames the distributive 
decision as representative activity carried out by way of program spending, rather than favoritism in 
procurement. After all, elected representatives are constitutionally empowered, even obligated, to represent 
the interests of their districts or states in national politics. This includes doing their best to shape government 
spending in the interests of constituents. However, when politically motivated spending is undertaken by 
favoring certain companies it violates established norms for several reasons. First, the very reason for having 
 
1 We thank Natalia Alvarado, Marco Cox and Marie Dumont for excellent research assistance. We also thank Rasmus Broms, 
Daniel Carpenter, Kristen Kao, George Krause, Victor Lapuente, Scott Limbocker, Bill Resh, Jennifer Selin, Anders Sundell, Michael 
Shepherd, Sheahan Virgin and the panelists of the panel “Exit, Voice, or Loyalty” at the 2018 Annual Meeting of the Southern 
Political Science Association in New Orleans, January 4-6, the participants at the Quality of Government Institute conference in 
Barcelona, January 28-31, 2018, and the participants in the panel “Agency integrity and design: effects on partisan politics and 
performance” at the 2018 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association in Boston, MA, August 30 – September 2, 
for helpful comments. Finally, we thank John Jennings for excellent language editing. The errors that remain are our own. 
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open tenders and private providers is to invite competition so as to decrease price and increase the quality of 
goods and services. When the connections or locality of the firm become important factors for making 
procurement decisions, this breaks with the spirit of the law. Second, as these personal or partisan concerns 
cannot be written into the tender, contract choices must involve collusion with the firm that violates both 
transparency and the formal criteria for awarding contracts. Third, such collusion will, in turn, invite an 
unhealthy relationship between certain parties and certain firms.  
In this paper we explore how the presence of appointees influences favoritism in procurement across 
agencies and time in the United States. We describe the federal contracting process and how agency design 
can facilitate or mitigate non-competitive procedures and outcomes. We evaluate resulting claims using new 
data on all United States government contracts between 2003 and 2015. We find that agencies with the most 
appointee influence, such as executive departments, are the most likely to have non-competitive processes 
and contracts characterized by single bids. We show that the electoral cycle, in line with our predictions, 
affects the number of non-competitive contracts asymmetrically: there are more non-competitive contracts in 
battleground states around elections, but only from agencies in executive departments. We interpret these as 
signs of politically motivated favoritism. We also demonstrate how party change in the White House 
influences the mixture of firms securing government contracts. New administrations secure contracts for a 
new set of firms but only in the most politicized agencies. This is also indicative of political favoritism in 
procurement because it suggests connections between certain parties and certain firms. We conclude by 
discussing the implication of the findings for the growing literature on distributive politics as well as for the 
theory underlying production of goods and services outside of government. 
 
Politicization and Favoritism in Procurement 
Most public personnel systems are divided loosely between two classes of employees (Ingraham 
1995; Lewis 2008). One class includes career civil servants selected, promoted, and retained on the basis of 
merit. These employees build careers in government and work across administrations. They try to advance in 
their careers through longevity and good performance, some on very general tracks and others in occupation 
specific paths. The other class of employees, usually higher in the hierarchy, is a temporary political class 
connected to the president in power. They work to advance the agenda of the official that selected them, and 
the party. This includes policy goals articulated by the president but also statements and actions that help the 
electoral fortunes of the party (Moore 2018; Tolchin and Tolchin 2015). 
When scholars examine favoritism at the federal level, there is little consensus about whether the 
risks are greater for civil servants or appointees. A case in point is the large literature in economics and 
political science on “regulatory capture” (Dal Bó 2006, 203) that has followed Stigler’s (1971) influential 
paper. In simple terms, this literature suggests that powerful firms use their position to bias regulations to 
their advantage at the expense of the public interest (e.g., McKay and Yackee 2007; Yackee and Yackee 2006; 
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see, however, Carpenter and Moss 2014). In principle, the regulated firm can use different means to achieve 
their desired outcome, which might include bribes to individual regulators, jobs in the firm and threats of 
ruining the regulator’s professional reputation. Scholars have also pointed out that regulators often have a 
background in the regulated industry, and the fact that regulators move back and forth between firms and 
agencies is often referred to as the “revolving door” phenomenon (Dal Bó 2006, 214). A possible implication 
of this literature could be that civil servants connected with specific firms would bias procurement procedures 
to that firm’s advantage. However, while both appointed and career regulators may have similar career-related 
incentives in a revolving door context, the partisan and electoral incentives arguably operate more powerfully 
on political appointees.  
Turning to the appointees, scholars have conducted a significant amount of work on the 
politicization of federal agencies but have rarely connected it to favoritism in procurement. Researchers have 
examined how elected officials alter the number, depth, and penetration of political appointees (e.g. Light 
1995; Lewis 2008). They have described how executives select appointees for loyalty, involve civil servants in 
political fights, and thrust political considerations into previously rule-driven agency decisions (e.g., 
Hollibaugh and Rothenberg 2018; Krause and O’Connell 2016; Moe 1985; Weko 1995). They have also 
exerted significant effort to measure the impact of increasing politicization on government performance (e.g. 
Gallo and Lewis 2012; Krause, Lewis, and Douglas 2006). 
The robust and growing literature on the distributive consequences of policymaking describes the 
link between agency politicization and tactical spending. Scholars have examined the influence of Congress 
and the president, sometimes examining distributive choices made in the legislative process (e.g., statute, 
committee report) and other times through agency choices. Kriner and Reeves (2015) demonstrate that 
presidents have systematically steered economic means to counties in swing states, especially during election 
years, and to counties in core states throughout their term. They identify political appointees as key players. 
Berry and Gersen (2017) describe how variation in agency insulation – and the influence of political 
appointees in particular – helps to explain spending decisions across federal agencies. With designs that allow 
more direct political control comes partisan responsiveness in agency spending decisions. Others describe 
how appointees help funnel money to battleground states or to the president’s core supporters (Hudak 2014) 
and serve the president’s interests by being strategically responsive to the interests of key members of 
Congress (Berry and Fowler 2016; Cox and McCubbins 1993; Crespin and Finocchiaro 2008; Fenno 1966; 
Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Levitt and Snyder 1995). In this view, agencies with designs that facilitate 
political control should be more likely to engage in contracting practices such as non-competitive solicitations 
and single bid contracts. 
Most directly related to this paper, presidential appointees can advance the interests of the president, 
party, and themselves by influencing their agency to direct contracts to firms in an electorally advantageous 
way. In his study of the distribution of federal grants Hudak (2014, p 166) explains why: “Essentially, it would 
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be a waste of work hours for the staffer to produce allocations that are inconsistent with appointee’s 
preferences because those proposals are unlikely to be chosen.” There are direct and indirect benefits to 
distributing contract dollars in particular ways. When firms connected to the appointee’s party or businesses 
in key electoral constituencies receive government contracts, this increases the chances that such firms will 
give credit to the current administration. This has electoral and financial benefits for the party in power 
(Kriner and Reeves 2015). The firm and its employees are more likely to vote for the party that gave them the 
contracts and they are more likely to give campaign donations to the party or related groups that support the 
party and its candidates. Government contracts targeted to key states can also provide an economic boost to 
those areas in ways that help the incumbent party. Incumbent parties tend to do better in elections when the 
economy is doing well (Duch and Stevenson 2008).  
The appointees themselves also benefit from their work on behalf of the party and the personal 
interactions they have with firms receiving government contracts. Those appointees that successfully advance 
the interests of the presidential administration improve their standing within the party and the constellation of 
groups or interests associated with the party. This includes politically connected law firms, think tanks, not-
for-profits, lobbyists, consultants, and contractors. Effective appointees improve their earning potential, since 
their connections and expertise open doors and are valuable inside and outside of government.  
Of course, effective work for the administration and party involves the exercise of favoritism within the 
limits of the law and public opinion. Appointees that clumsily flout the law can hurt both the administration 
and their own career prospects by inviting legal and journalistic scrutiny (Gordon 2011). Agency officials 
cannot publicly promise government contracts to specific areas or vendors. Rather, they can promise that 
firms will finally get a “fair shake” and they can offer to help firms navigate the complex procurement 
process. Moreover, they decry the fact that firms doing “such terrific work” are not being recognized by 
current agency officials and pledge to do everything they can under the law to make sure that the fine 
products and services of specific firms are given adequate attention in the procurement process. These kinds 
of public signals, when followed by contract dollars, help firms and their employees give credit to the 
administration and its appointees. Enterprising agencies can arrange visits by agency appointees and public 
events in order to cement the connection between the firm, the agency, and the new contract dollars.  
 
Mechanics of Favoritism in Federal Contracting 
Across the executive establishment, both career civil servants and political appointees make decisions 
about whether to purchase a good or service and what procedure to use to do so. The types of persons (i.e., 
careerist or appointee) involved and the amount of purchasing oversight varies by agency, the value of the 
contract, and the process chosen. In some agencies, high ranking officials are involved early in procurement 
choices. Other agencies devolve most purchasing decisions to lower level managers. High value contracts, 
particularly those chosen through non-competitive processes, must receive approval from increasingly high 
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(political) levels of senior agency officials. The structure of the hierarchy in an agency can be an important 
predictor of the degree of political influence in contract choices. 
The formal procurement process begins when a federal agency decides to purchase a good or service. 
Program officials usually initiate the process and work with contracting officers that help them purchase what 
they need. If a new2 contract is required, the agency will proceed governed by rules detailed in the 
Competition in Contracting Act (CICA), the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), and any other agency-
specific regulations that govern purchasing.3 Contract officers do the technical work of selecting a process, 
writing up requirements, posting a notice and solicitation, and so forth. They often lack the expertise to 
independently evaluate the programmatic needs that motivated the purchase, particularly for large or non-
commercial contracts. This can limit the influence of career contract officers in key parts of the procurement 
process.  
Some agencies also have appointees that head offices of small business development, minority 
business development, small and disadvantaged business utilization, or related offices whose job involves 
helping businesses secure agency contracts. This includes helping firms take the necessary steps to secure 
government contracts and making them aware of contracting opportunities in the agency. It also involves 
facilitating relationships between eligible firms and the agency officials making contract decisions. When 
contracting officials know the parties seeking agency contracts, they can more easily see the value of the firm 
and have more confidence in the products or services offered by that firm. As one how-to book on 
government contracting emphasized, a key factor in securing contracts is “the power of relationships.” 
(Amtower 2011). Appointees in business development roles guide firms to government contracts. 
 
Full and Open Competition 
Importantly, the CICA requires that agencies secure goods and services through “full and open 
competition through the use of competitive procedures.” An open and competitive process for non-
commercial contracts over $150,000 commonly involves 1) a notice of forthcoming solicitation; 2) a public 
invitation for bids (IFB) (usually on the government’s central purchasing website); 3) a predetermined period 
for accepting (usually sealed) bids; and 4) choosing the lowest bid from among responsible bidders.4 Another 
open and competitive process requires agencies to publish a request for proposals (RFP), negotiate with 
 
2 Sometimes, agencies can get what they need without a new contract. They can use an agency purchase card (usually for 
purchases less than $2,500) or task order under an existing contract (e.g., agency has contracted with a firm to provide a type of 
service when asked).  
3 Not all purchases are considered contracts and not all contracts are secured through CICA. A few agencies (e.g., Defense, Health 
and Human Services, Energy, and Homeland Security) have other transaction authority (OTA) which is used for purchasing for 
prototypes or research and development. These kinds of interactions are difficult to contract because the outcome of the exchange 
is uncertain, pricing is difficult, or firms may not be able or willing to comply with procurement regulations. There are also statutes 
that explicitly authorize procurement procedures distinct from CICA (Manual 2010, 6). 
4 The CICA allows for the use of simplified procedures for small purchases, those below the “simplified acquisition threshold”, for 
non-commercial contracts. This threshold is currently $150,000. The simplified acquisition threshold for commercial items (i.e. goods 
or services that are also used by the general public, such as cars) is instead $6.5 million. 
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potential bidders in “the competitive range,” and then award the bid to the party providing the best value to 
the government. There are other processes that satisfy the “open and competitive requirements” in the law 
that make allowances for specific kinds of proposals (e.g., architectural, research), the need for multiple 
awards to the same firms (i.e., General Services Administration multiple awards schedule), and set-asides for 
specific types of bidders (e.g., small businesses, minority owned businesses). Contracts below the simplified 
acquisition threshold are regularly set aside for small businesses and ideally small businesses compete with 
one another for these contracts.  
 
Non-competitive Processes 
Agencies may also choose a formally non-competitive process. The CICA allows agency officials to 
choose a non-competitive process when one of several extenuating circumstances is present, such as national 
security or an unusually urgent need.5 Both Congress and the president have complained that agencies 
overuse non-competitive processes and have decried an increase in such processes (Congressional Research 
Service 2015; U.S. House Committee on Government on Government Reform 2006). Choosing a non-
competitive process does, however, trigger additional reporting and approval requirements, depending upon 
the value of the contract.6 For example, for contracts between $150,000 and $650,000, the contracting officer 
must formally justify the non-competitive procedure but no official sign off is required. For contracts above 
this amount but below $12.5 million, a higher level official designated the competition advocate must approve. As 
contract values exceed $12.5 million, even higher level agency officials must sign off on the non-competitive 
process. All justifications and approvals of non-competitive awards must be posted on the federal 
government’s procurement website and be open to challenge by other bidders. The dollar thresholds and 
designated officials vary some over time and by agency. Presidential appointees are more likely to be 
designated Chief Acquisition Officer in executive departments and career professionals are more likely in 
independent agencies.7 This influence who has approval authority for non-competitive processes and who 
sets overall procurement policy for the agency.  
 
“Competitive” Processes and Non-competitive Outcomes 
Agency officials can choose non-competitive or competitive processes that result in non-competitive 
outcomes such as single bids from preferred firms. Agency officials can design processes that satisfy the 
requirements of “open and competitive” under CICA that still importantly shape the pool of participants 
 
5 Specifically, a non-competitive process can be chosen when 1) there is only one provider; 2) circumstances are unusually urgent; 
3) the agency must use the selection process to maintain an industrial base (e.g., keep important firms in business to maintain the 
market); 4) specific international agreements are involved; 5) a statute specifically provides for a specified source (e.g., purchase 
from Prison Industries); 6) there are national security concerns; or 7) the agency head determines a non-competitive process is in 
the public interest. 
6 Agency heads may use non-competitive processes to award contracts if they determine that doing so is in the public interest. They 
must notify Congress more than 30 days prior to the award of the contract (Congressional Research Service 2015, 12). 
7 There are special rules in place for the Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Coast Guard. 
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(e.g., invocation of set-asides, limited notification or solicitation period). They can also proceed under 
technically neutral procedures that favor preferred firms. Program officials can ask procurement specialists to 
write specifications into solicitations that effectively favor some potential bidders. In the same way that 
academic job advertisements can be more or less specific (and with predictable outcomes), so the 
construction of an IFB or RFP can shape the pool of bidders in predictable ways. Knowledge of and 
connection to specific firms and their capabilities can shape the specifications included in solicitations. While 
the CICA admonishes contract officers to “develop specifications in such a manner as is necessary to obtain 
full and open competition,” it can be difficult to make the tradeoff between the goal of getting exactly what 
the program official wants and the goal of open competition (Congressional Research Service 2015).  
 
Appointees, Non-competitive Processes, and Non-competitive Outcomes 
The presence of appointees in programmatic positions (e.g., bureau chief, division head) or procurement 
positions (e.g., Assistant Secretary for Administration, Director of Office of Small and Disadvantaged 
Business Utilization) can influence the form of contracts. Programmatic officials can support preferred 
private sector firms through the specifications included in IFBs/RFPs. New appointees in procurement 
positions can influence the actions of contract officers by signaling to contract officers that they prefer newer 
less-established firms (including those introduced by appointees in the Small and Disadvantaged Business 
Office) or, conversely, that they prefer existing established firms (if the administration has been in office for a 
while). The procurement appointees also designate contract executives such as the competition advocate and 
they approve exceptions to competitive processes. Both programmatic and procurement appointees benefit 
from contracts awarded to firms connected to the party. Attentive contract officers seeking to advance in 
their careers will recognize that contract actions benefiting such firms, provided they are within the letter of 
the law, will be more successful within the agency. 
Taken together, the presence of appointees in key programmatic or procurement positions is 
important for political favoritism in purchasing. When appointees propose or approve contracts, lower level 
officials are more likely to propose procedures, and ultimately contract outcomes, that appointees prefer. 
When careerists propose and approve contracts, however, lower level officials are more likely to design 
competitive processes. Our first hypothesis is therefore: 
H1: Politicized agencies will produce more non-competitive processes and outcomes in contracting. 
Moreover, we expect different dynamics in agencies with high and low levels of politicization. More 
specifically, politically responsive agencies should produce contracts that potentially boost support for the 
incumbent in battleground states, particularly around elections. Consequently, we expect that: 
H2: Politicized agencies will use more non-competitive processes and secure non-competitive outcomes for work in 
battleground states around presidential elections. 
Finally, if politically motivated spending is funneled through companies with partisan connections, 
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the companies receiving contracts from politicized agencies should change in a predictable way with White 
House turnover. When there is party change in the White House we should observe significant turnover in 
firms winning contracts from politicized agencies but not in insulated agencies.  
H3: After presidential turnover, politicized agencies are more likely than insulated agencies to give out contracts to a 
different set of companies than those contracted before the election. 
In total, U.S. federal law and executive guidance require open and competitive processes as the 
default. Within formally open legal processes, however, there is discretion to favor some parties over others. 
Formal deviations from open and competitive processes require approvals from higher up in the hierarchy. 
This means that the composition of the agency hierarchy is important for determining favoritism.  
 
Research Strategy  
As mentioned above, there are legal requirements on federal agencies, codified in the CICA, of open 
competition in public procurement. If agencies deliberately depart from open procedures in otherwise 
competitive markets, we interpret this as a potential sign of favoritism. We therefore look for diversions from 
the legally defined expectations when we evaluate the relationship between politicization and procurement 
favoritism. Our primary dependent variables for hypotheses 1 and 2 are indicators of the type of procedure and 
the outcome in the procurement process. We record if the procurement procedure was restricted (non-
competitive procedure), when only one bid was submitted in a tender (non-competitive outcome), and we 
combine non-competitive procedure and single bids to get a measure that captures both procedure and 
outcome. 
We use data on all regulated federal contracts in the United States from 2003-2015. We obtained the 
data from usaspending.gov and aggregate spending items to the contract level. The federal contracting 
database includes information on all contracts above a mandatory reporting threshold ($25,000 for most of 
our period) awarded by federal agencies regulated by the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).8 In total there 
are more than 2.1 million contracts (for a comprehensive discussion see Fazekas et al. 2018). We focus here 
on contracts above $150,000 because procurement laws are not as strict for low value contracts. This 
restriction cuts our sample size to a little under 550,000 contracts.  
Even after restricting our sample to high-value contracts and including a demanding set of controls 
in all our analyses (see below for a discussion about the controls), there is a remaining risk of bias from the 
different composition of spending across agencies. In addition to our main regression analyses, we therefore 
divide our sample by agency design into treated (politicized, i.e. executive departments incl. bureaus) and 
control (less politicized, i.e. independent agencies and independent commissions) categories and implement a 
 
8 There are a number of legally mandated exceptions, and exchanges with domain experts suggest that administrative error may 
bias the database to a small degree. Nevertheless, we assess that our claim to complete representation of federal purchasing is 
adequate. For information on the Federal Acquisition Regulation see https://www.acquisition.gov/browsefar. 
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propensity score matching estimator (for more on our independent variables, see below). The matching 
estimator uses the same set of controls as the regression models9 but imposing common support reduces the 
sample size to little over 100,000 contracts. After this matching procedure the imbalance between the 
treatment and the control groups is very small on observable confounding characteristics (median bias 
decreases from 68% to 8%). This provides a means for comparing politicized (treated) and less politicized 
(control) agencies on similar contracts in similar situations, where the most important difference is agency 
structure. Full details of matching quality can be found in Appendix A and B. 
Finally, to assess our third hypothesis – whether presidential turnover leads to a different set of 
companies winning contracts in more politicized agencies – we identify companies winning bids using the 
same source as above. Specifically, we want to determine whether firms that received contracts after a 
presidential transition had received contracts prior to the transition. As in all markets, there is considerable 
supplier persistence in public procurement. A large proportion of contracts are awarded to companies that 
repeatedly win. For example, in the middle of the second term of President Bush, 2006-2008, 48 percent of 
firms receiving new contracts had received contracts in the prior year. If there is partisan favoritism, we 
would expect this percentage to drop markedly for more politicized agencies after presidential turnover, while 
staying the same in less politicized agencies. We study the transition from President Bush to President Obama 
in 2009 and analyze contracts awarded one year before Election Day (November 4, 2007 to November 4, 
2008) and two years after the Inauguration Day (January 20, 2009 to January 20, 2011). We exclude the 
presidential transition period (November 4, 2008 to January 20, 2009). We choose a two-year period after the 
new president takes office because new administrations need several months to take full control of the federal 
administration and then the contracting process (initiating and launching new federal tenders) adds several 
months before contracts are awarded, taking about one year until the results of the new administration can 
show up in our data. In this analysis we consider those companies as repeat winners that have already won a 
contract in the year before winning the contract in question. 
The distinction between politicized and less politicized agencies as treatment and control groups 
respectively, and the distinct timing of the presidential change allows us to construct the analysis as a 
difference-in-differences (DiD) estimation on the contract level. Our expectation is that more contracts with 
new firms are given out from politicized agencies after presidential turnover, while contracts from less 
politicized agencies remain the same. In order to justify inference from a DiD estimation an assumption of 
parallel trends in the two groups (politicized and less politicized agencies) is required. In our case the supplier 
pool and contract types in the two groups differ markedly, so the parallel trends assumption may be violated. 
To counter this problem, we carry out contract level matching using the same control variables as in our 
other analyses (for more on the controls see below), both before elections and after inauguration periods. The 
 
9 With the exception of department-level covariates, which are not defined for independent administrations and commissions.  
 
 
11 
combination of matching and DiD estimation for this purpose has been used broadly, for example in 
development (Cattaneo et al 2009) and management (Rowley et al 2017) studies. Among other things, such 
matching removes defense-related contracts from the control group, making remaining contracts more 
similar. 
 
 Independent Variables 
We use two measures of agency politicization. The first taps in to which agencies are structurally 
insulated from political pressure. We include indicators for cabinet departments (not a separate bureau), 
distinct bureaus within cabinet departments, independent administrations, and independent commissions in a 
rough order of least to most insulated (Epstein and O’Halloran 1999; Selin 2015). We disaggregate the 
components of executive departments since there is potentially more political intervention in contracts 
produced by department-wide offices (e.g., Office of the Secretary) than in contracts produced by an 
independent bureau within a larger department.  
 
TABLE 1, SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable name Mean S.D. N 
Agency size: no. of contracts awarded (Log) 9.97 1.64 569706 
Agency size: no. of full time employees (Log) 7.05 3.65 555724 
Agency: any SES contracting officers (Y/N) 0.78 1.39 569706 
Agency: no. of contracting officers (Log) 3.41 3.44 555724 
Agency: no. of SES contracting officers (Log) -0.43 3.81 555724 
Contract value (Log) 13.52 1.55 569706 
Non-competitive procedure 0.37 0.48 569706 
Single bidder contract 0.54 0.50 547309 
Single bidder contract & non-competitive procedure 0.35 0.48 564700 
 
The second measure is a more direct result of politicization. We calculate the percentage of 
appointees in each agency as the deviation from the agency average for the studied time period (i.e., 
normalized [#appointees/# supervisors] per agency-year).10 Taking the deviations from agency average is 
better than taking the simple percentage of appointees as it allows us to capture the within-agency variation. 
The measure of deviation is, in many ways, preferable to a raw percentage since small commissions tend to 
have large percentages of appointees (e.g., each commissioner and one staff member per commissioner), 
making them incorrectly appear politicized. A measure of raw percentages is also rather stable and therefore 
 
10 In order to check the robustness of the results we have also used the relative deviation from the period average as well as a 
dichotomy capturing if the percentage of appointees is above (1) or below (0) the agency average, with essentially the same results. 
See appendix C. The source for the data is the Office of Personnel Management’s EHRI database. Specifically, the measure of 
politicization includes all Schedule C, non-career SES, and persons on the EX pay scale. The denominator is the number of 
supervisors during the time period with a supervisor 2 code. 
 
 
12 
largely captures cross-agency differences.11  
There are pros and cons with both measures, but taken together they provide a fuller picture. While 
the first measure captures well established differences in design it does not vary over time, and therefore only 
allows us to explore between agency differences, while the deviation of appointees from the agency average 
taps into within agency variation. Taken together, within-agency politicization and cross agency structural 
insulation allow us to decompose the two different components of agency structure. Moreover, using these 
two measures allows us to further explore how an increased number of appointees have different effects 
depending on the broader agency design by interacting them with each other.  
To evaluate whether agencies produce non-competitive contracts for partisan reasons, we evaluate 
whether firms in competitive states during presidential elections are treated differently than other states. 
Specifically, we evaluate whether contracts with firms in battleground states are more likely to have non-
competitive features. To identify battleground states, we use journalistic sources for each election (see 
Appendix D) and code such states with a 1 in the year before, during, and after the presidential elections of 
2004, 2008, and 2012.12 We assume that pressures applied during the election year may result in contracts let 
out in the first part of the year after the election.  Contracts can take months between initiation and 
disbursement. We interact contracts in battleground states with the agency design measures to determine 
whether the most politicized agencies are the most sensitive to the electoral importance of firms in different 
states. Our expectation is that contracts in battleground states should be more likely to have non-competitive 
features.  
 
Control Variables 
In each of the models, we include a robust set of control variables to account for time, sector, location, 
market, contract, department- and agency-level confounders. First, we include year fixed effects to account 
for common time shocks such as economic crises. Second, we include sector fixed effects accounting for 
general effects of 34 broad economic sectors such as research and development or construction of facilities.13 
Third, we consider log contract value in order to control for differences due to contract size, both in terms of 
oversight and company bidding behavior. Fourth, the models contain state fixed effects to account for time-
invariant location characteristics such as development of local supplier markets. Fifth, we account for 
Executive Department characteristics both by including the number of contracting officers (proxying the 
importance and professionalization of contracting within the department overseeing the agency) and by 
 
11 This is a general problem in using appointee percentages as a measure of politicization—namely, small changes in the number of 
employees or managers (i.e., the denominator) often swamp changes in the number of appointees. So, big changes in politicization 
reflect changes in employment rather than politicization.  
12 We include one year after the election since spending can be promised during the election campaign but not be materialized until 
the next fiscal year (i.e., contract processes are not instantaneous). 
13 The sectoral categorization comes from the official federal nomenclature, to be found at 
https://www.acquisition.gov/sites/default/files/page_file_uploads/PSC%20Manual%20-%20Final%20-
%209%20August%202015_0.pdf  
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adding Executive Department fixed effects accounting for unobserved department characteristics that reflect 
the oversight of agencies of varying levels of insulation.14 Finally, we account for agency characteristics (size) 
by including the log number of contracts awarded by the agency in the whole period. 
 
Results 
In Table 2 we report estimates of binary logistic regression models of non-competitive processes and 
outcomes with fixed effects for year, sector, state and department, and controls for contract value, total 
amount of agency contracts as well as the number and type of contracting officers by both department and 
agency. Since the observations are not independent across cases, we use clustered standard errors by agency. 
We include three models with different indicators of political favoritism: 1) the use of non-competitive 
procedure, 2) a non-competitive—i.e., single-bid—outcome, and 3) non-competitive procedure and single bid 
outcome combined.  
Importantly, the estimates in Table 2 confirm the basic relationship we expected, namely that 
contracts issued by the most politicized agencies have the highest probability of being awarded in a non-
competitive process and result in a process with only one bidder. Compared to the most insulated agencies, 
independent commissions and independent regulatory commissions, which is our baseline category, the 
coefficient estimates are large and positive for executive departments, particularly for department-wide 
offices, indicating that the probability that the procurement process is non-competitive is higher when the 
structure allows for more direct political influence. Moreover, we have employed a propensity score matching 
technique as outlined in the methods section, with results consistent with our main findings reported in 
Appendix A. 
Figure 1 reports the predicted probability for non-competitive processes and outcomes by agency 
type based on model 3 (non-competitive procedures and outcomes combined). It is lowest for independent 
commissions (16%) and slightly higher for independent administrations (18%). The risk increases 
considerably in less insulated federal agencies such as bureaus within executive departments (35%) and 
components of executive departments that are not bureaus (48%). These findings are consistent even for 
different subsets of the data. This is important initial evidence that agency design matters for political 
favoritism. Agencies that are designed to allow appointees more influence use non-competitive procurement 
processes more, and their procurement more often results in single bid outcomes. 
 
 
 
14 Note that independent agencies and commissions have no department overseeing them (35 % of the sample), and that units 
within executive departments may (59%) or may not (5%) be a distinct bureau (i.e., department-wide office). Including executive 
department fixed effects does therefore not interfere with our measurement of insulation from politics as the two refer to different 
levels. In other words, agency insulation varies within each department. 
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TABLE 2, AGENCY POLITICIZATION AND NON-COMPETITIVE PROCESS AND SINGLE BID OUTCOMES IN 
FEDERAL PROCUREMENT, 2003-2015  
  (1) (2) (3) 
 
Non-competitive 
procedure 
Single bidder 
contract 
Non-competitive 
procedure and 
outcome 
Baseline (Agency type): Indep. Com. & Reg. 
Com. 
   
Agency type: Independent Admin. 0.275 -0.102 0.154 
Agency type: Executive Dept. (Bureau) 1.588** 0.423 1.200 
Agency type: Executive Dept. (Not Bureau) 2.154*** 0.979* 1.827*** 
Controls 
Contract award year Y Y Y 
Contract sector Y Y Y 
Contract value Y Y Y 
Agency office: state Y Y Y 
Dept. FE Y Y Y 
Dept.: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of contracts awarded Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of full-time employees Y Y Y 
Agency: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency: no. of SES contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency: any SES contracting officers (Y/N) Y Y Y 
Constant Y Y Y 
Observations 541,561 520,67 537,122 
Pseudo R2 or R2 0.093 0.080 0.097 
Note: *p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Binary l regression results (standard errors clustered by agencogisticy). 
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FIGURE 1, ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF A NON-COMPARATIVE PROCESS AND SINGLE BID OUTCOME 
BY AGENCY DESIGN, UNITED STATES 2003-2015 
  
   Note: Based on Model 3 in Table 2. 
 
To further explore the effects of agency design Table 3 includes each agency’s normalized appointee 
percentage (relative to supervisors) to measure within-agency variation in politicization. Model 1 includes this 
measure alone, Model 2 controls for types of agency design, and Model 3 interacts them. Since the measure 
only captures within-agency differences, it is demanding. The average effect, however, is large, positive and 
significant, as expected. This suggests that increased appointee percentages are correlated with non-
competitive procurement, even when controlling for a host of agency and contract-specific factors. 
The interaction with executive departments is large, positive and statistically significant. It indicates 
that an increase in the number of appointees strikes hardest exactly where it should, namely within directly 
politically responsive executive departments. When agency design is such that it allows for an involvement of 
appointees in the contracting process, an increased number of appointees is associated with more non-
competitive procurement. Figure 2 reports the marginal effect of the interaction model together with the 
confidence interval (to increase readability we have only plotted the predictive margins for executive 
departments, not bureau). 
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TABLE 3, NORMALIZED APPOINTEE PERCENTAGE AND NON-COMPETITIVE PROCESSES AND SINGLE BID 
OUTCOMES IN FEDERAL PROCUREMENT, 2003-2015  
  
Single bidder contract & non-
competitive procedure 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Norm. appoint. (appoint. perc. dev. from period avg.) 3.534** 3.699**   
Baseline (Agency type): Independent Com. & Independent Reg. Com.    
Agency type: Independent Admin.  0.282 0.282 
Agency type: Executive Dept. (Bureau)  0.097 0.097 
Agency type: Executive Dept. (Not Bureau)  0.710 0.712 
Norm. appoint. * Independent Com. & Independent Reg. Com     0.574 
Norm. appoint. * Independent Admin.   -0.698 
Norm. appoint. * Executive Dep. (Bureau)   -4.879 
Norm. appoint. * Executive Dep. (Not Bureau)   4.58*** 
Controls 
Contract Award Year Y Y Y 
Contract Sector Y Y Y 
Contract value Y Y Y 
Agency Office: State Y Y Y 
Dept. FE Y Y N 
Dept.: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of contracts awarded Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of full-time employees Y Y Y 
Agency: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency: no. of SES contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency: any SES contracting officers (Y/N) Y Y Y 
Constant Y Y Y 
Observations 466,181 466,181 466,181 
Pseudo R2 0.098 0.098 0.098 
Note: Binary logistic regression results (standard errors clustered by agency). The main effect in Model 3 is in the row “Norm. appoint. * Exe. Dep. (Not 
Bureau)”. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
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FIGURE 2. ESTIMATED EFFECTS OF NORMALIZED APPOINTEE PERCENTAGE IN EXECUTIVE 
DEPARTMENT ON NON-COMPETITIVE PROCESS AND SINGLE BID OUTCOMES, 2003-2015 
 
     Note: Figure 2 shows predictive margins with 95% cls., based on Model 3, Table 3, for Executive Departments (not bureaus). 
 
All in all, this is important evidence that differences in agency design influence the content of 
contracts. Contracts from the most politicized parts of the executive branch are more likely to have features 
we associate with favoritism. We would, however, like to highlight two additional observations. First, it is 
interesting that the effect of agency design seems to tail away (i.e., compare independent administrations vs. 
independent commissions in Figure 1). This might be suggestive that there are different dynamics creating 
favoritism and that while the political risks are washed out by increased insulation, other risks remain. Second, 
a more politicized staff seems to be more harmful for contracting exactly when the agency structure allows 
appointees to have a more direct influence over contracting decisions, and where the president’s political 
priorities should be most prevalent. 
 
Politicization and Favoritism in Battleground States 
While contracts produced by the more politicized department-wide offices had the highest estimated 
probabilities of being non-competitive and single-bid, our suggestion was that this, in part, is a consequence 
of electoral factors. In Table 4 we include models that account for whether firms were located in battleground 
states, and the estimates are revealing. First, the estimates suggest that contracts in battleground states 
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(compared to less politically salient states) are more likely to have non-competitive processes and outcomes 
(Model 1) throughout the 2003-2015 period, which had seen multiple presidential elections with the list of 
battleground states shifting over time. The average effect, however, is small and statistically insignificant. 
The reason for the small average effect is partly that the impact of spending in battleground states is 
mitigated by agency insulation (Model 3, Figure 3). In the most politicized federal agencies, executive 
departments (not bureaus), we find a notable increase in risks of non-competitive procurement when 
spending in battleground states (from 44 to 49 percent). The least politicized agencies are actually estimated 
to produce more non-competitive contracts in non-battleground states (12 compared to 15 percent). While 
electoral and partisan factors influence the contracting procedure and its contents, this is primarily the case in 
the agencies where political officials penetrate most deeply. This evidence suggests that when agency design is 
such that both oversight and management positions are held by appointees, it can facilitate the production of 
non-competitive procedures and single-bid contracts. 15 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
15 An alternative way to connect a contract to a specific state would be to use the place of performance instead of firm location. 
Unfortunately, this increases the number of missing cases dramatically and therefore we prefer the analyses reported in Table 4. 
We have, however, performed analyses using place of performance. The results are substantively the same, see Appendix E. 
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TABLE 4. AGENCY POLITICIZATION, ELECTORAL PRESSURES AND FEDERAL PROCUREMENT, 2003-
2015 
  
Single bidder contract & non-
competitive procedure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Battleground state = 0    
Battleground state = 1 0.0725 0.0731   
Baseline (Agency type): Independent Com. & Independent Reg. Com.    
Agency type: Independent Administration   0.248 0.147 
Agency type: Executive Dept. (Bureau)  1.185 1.096 
Agency type: Executive Dept. (Not Bureau)  1.819** 1.668** 
Battleground state * Independent Com. & Independent. Reg. Com.   -0.249 
Battleground state * Independent Admin.   0.088 
Battleground state * Executive Dept. (Bureau)   0.0303 
Battleground state * Executive Dept. (Not Bureau)   0.230*** 
Controls 
Contract Award Year Y Y Y 
Contract Sector Y Y Y 
Contract value Y Y Y 
Agency Office: State Y Y Y 
Dept. FE Y Y N 
Dep.: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of contracts awarded Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of full-time employees Y Y Y 
Agency: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency: no. of SES contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency: any SES contracting officers (Y/N) Y Y Y 
Constant Y Y Y 
Observations 368,891 368,891 368,891 
Pseudo R2 0.099 0.099 0.099 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Binary logistic regression results (standard errors clustered by agency). The main effect of battleground state in 
Model 3 is Battleground state * Executive Dept. (Not Bureau). 
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FIGURE 3. ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF A NON-COMPETITIVE PROCESS AND SINGLE BID OUTCOME BY 
AGENCY DESIGN AND FIRM LOCATION IN A  BATTLEGROUND STATE, UNITED STATES 2003-2015 
 
Note: Based on Model 3, Table 4. 
 
Agency Politicization, Presidential Turnover and Supplier Persistence  
Another implication of our argument is that a new presidential administration should have a different 
set of companies winning contracts, particularly in more politicized agencies. If, after a transition of power in 
the White House, we observe a systematic difference in the percentage of repeat winners in executive 
departments versus independent administrations and commissions, this is evidence of a relationship between 
the parties and certain firms. 
As mentioned above, we estimate a difference-in-differences (DiD) regression model on a matched 
sample of contracts in order to filter out those contracts which have different time horizons by nature across 
politicized and less politicized organizations (e.g. long-term defense contracts are removed, considerably 
balancing the contract samples across agencies and time). Our DiD models take the transition from President 
Bush to President Obama in 2009 as the cut-point comparing contracts awarded one year before Election 
Day and two years after the Inauguration Day. As the dependent variable for these models, we use the 
dummy variable whether the supplier is a repeat winner or not. A repeat winner company is defined as one 
which won at least one contract during the previous year compared to the year of the contract award. Table 5 
reports these regression results, first, looking at agency politicization on its own; second, time period on its 
own, and then looking at the difference in differences across time periods and agency types.  
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TABLE 5. AGENCY POLITICIZATION AND SUPPLIER PERSISTENCE IN FEDERAL PROCUREMENT, 
11/4/2007-1/20/2011 
  Repeated winner across 2009 presidency change 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: (Agency type) Indep. Admin. & Indep. Com.    
Agency type: Executive Dept. (Incl. Bureau) = 1 -0.386***   -0.364*** 
Baseline: Period 1: 11/04/2007 - 11/04/2008    
Period 2: 01/20/2009 - 01/20/2010  -0.143*** -0.156*** 
Period 3: 01/20/2010 - 01/20/2011  -0.0778** -0.0397 
Executive Dept. (Incl. Bureau) * Period 2: 01/20/2009 - 01/20/2010   0.0342 
Executive Dept. (Incl. Bureau) * Period 3: 01/20/2010 - 01/20/2011   -0.115* 
Controls 
Contract sector Y Y Y 
Contract value Y Y Y 
Agency office: state Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of contracts awarded Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of full-time employees Y Y Y 
Agency: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency: no. of SES contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency: any SES contracting officers (Y/N) Y Y Y 
Constant Y Y Y 
Observations 32,260 32,260 32,260 
Pseudo R2 0.064 0.060 0.064 
Note: Table 5 reports binary logistic regression results on the contract level. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
First, we find consistently higher supplier persistence in independent administrations and 
commissions throughout the whole period (Model 1). Second, we identify a marked drop in supplier 
persistence after the president changes, especially in the first year into the Obama administration (Model 2). 
Third and most importantly for our hypothesis, the observed overall drop in supplier persistence after the 
change of president is almost entirely due to more politicized agencies, with hardly any change for 
independent administrations and commissions (Model 3 and Figure 4). In absolute terms in Model 3, the gap 
between politically responsive executive departments and less politically responsive independent 
administrations and commissions increases to 9 percentage points (33.3 versus 24.3 percentages) in the 
second year after president change, compared to the 7 percentage point difference in the year before the 
elections (34 versus 27 percentages). 
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FIGURE 4. PREDICTED PROBABILITY OF A REPEATING WINNER BEFORE AND AFTER INAUGURATION 
DAY (MODEL 3, TABLE 5), 2007-2011 
 
Note: Figure 4 shows predictive margins with 95% cls., based on Model 3, Table 5. It starts one year before the presidential election 2008 (-1 year), and 
continues until two years (+2 years) after President Obama’s 2009 inauguration.  
 
One could, of course, suspect that the observed differences in repeat winners are driven by policy 
changes such as less spending on the military or spending in different states, but this can be ruled out since 
we carefully matched controls on all of the major covariates we have used so far. This includes the economic 
sector of the contract, removing all those control contracts that have no matching pair in the treatment group 
(e.g. there is very little defense and security spending going on in independent administrations and 
commissions). (Details of the goodness of matching are reported in Appendix B). 
 
Discussion  
In our analysis of all higher value United States government contracts between 2003 and 2015, a few 
findings stand out. First, the non-competitive process and single bid outcomes we study are common features 
of agency procurement. Our theory suggests that non-competitiveness, in part, is a consequence of political 
pressure, more palpable in agencies with appointees in programmatic or procurement positions. Therefore, it 
is important to note that our second key finding is that executive departments, particularly more politicized 
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department-wide offices (e.g., Office of the Secretary), are the most likely to engage in non-competitive 
contracting behavior. Another indication of the political dynamic that we observe is that politically responsive 
agencies – but only those – give out more non-competitive contracts in battleground states. Finally, we see 
greater turnover in firms receiving government contracts after party change in the White House but only in 
the more politicized agencies, again suggesting partisan and electoral forces driving contracting choices. 
There is however an argument to be made against our interpretation. Plausibly, the non-competitive 
processes and single-bid outcomes might be a means for shrewd procurement officials to get around rules 
and select the firms they know to be the best. This is difficult to disentangle empirically because we do not 
observe the counterfactual of the same contracts secured through truly competitive processes. If we could, we 
could compare costs and quality of outputs between those resulting from competitive vs. non-competitive 
contracts. Still, in Table F1 in Appendix F we present estimates from models where we regress cost overruns 
(ratio of final cost to the value of the awarded contract) against the non-competitive process and single bid 
outcomes of the contracts in the data. We include the controls as in earlier models in order to plausibly 
compare similar contracts to one another. The estimates suggest that non-competitive contracts are estimated 
to increase costs during implementation by 3-3.5 percentage points. While the percentage difference might 
appear small, given the enormous values involved, the savings potential from more competitive contracting is 
very large. A back of the envelope calculation, taking the average contract value of non-competitive contracts 
as a benchmark, suggests that had non-competitive contracts been contracted in a competitive procedure with 
more than one bidder, the federal government could have saved 25.1 billion USD per annum on contract 
implementation costs, which is approximately the total annual procurement spending of the Department of 
Energy (using Model 3 cost overrun estimates). The non-competitive contracts appear to cost taxpayers 
notably more than other contracts. 
Finally, in this paper we present no evidence of collusion between career civil servants and private 
firms even though this is a prominent concern in the literature (Dal Bó 2006). Indeed, contracting processes 
in independent commissions were the least likely to have non-competitive process and single bid outcomes. 
This may be because there are so many appointees in the United States that there are few cases with too little 
politicization. We also note, however, that there is significant diversity among independent commissions, 
including agencies as diverse as the Merit Systems Protection Board and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission. In the former agency, firm connections are thin and, in the latter, thick. It is reasonable to 
expect that when one disentangles the different kinds of commissions and related labor markets, that 
favoritism related to too little politicization may emerge. Indeed, a number of scholars find that an 
appropriate balance between appointees and careerists is best for performance (e.g. Golden 2000; Krause et 
al. 2006). 
 
 
 
 
24 
Conclusion 
This paper tackles the political practices around government procurement, one of the largest and 
fastest growing parts of the United States federal budget. The paper explains how little the goal of open 
competition is realized, particularly for larger contracts, and describes how political favoritism works its way 
into contracting decisions. Indeed, a significant proportion – 35 percent – of contracts above $150,000 is 
characterized by non-competitive processes and outcomes. This is a high percentage, particularly since the 
mechanism for improving quality and reducing costs is a competitive market. In other words, while the prime 
motivation for contracting out is improved efficiency, this generally relies upon the belief that procurement 
decisions occur through open competition and are not subject to political interference in selection. This paper 
points out that these conditions are often lacking. We find many non-competitive processes and outcomes - 
deviations from competitive goals - due to political factors. 
It might not surprise students of distributive politics that government procurement, at times, is 
motivated by political favoritism. Presidents and their parties are incentivized to boost support before, and to 
repay loyalists after elections. A rather large discussion revolves around the distributive consequences of 
policy choices made by the president and Congress, and is particularly concerned with how these decisions 
are driven by tactical, partisan, or even individual concerns (Berry and Fowler 2016; Kriner and Reeves 2015). 
In practice, much of the spending in, for example, battleground states is channeled through federal agencies 
(Berry and Gersen 2017). However, this paper explains why partisan distribution through procurement, rather 
than program spending, is different and probably a graver problem because it, first, goes against the very 
reason for having open tenders, second, involves collusion with private firms, and third, that repeated 
favoritism fosters an unhealthy relationship between certain parties and certain firms. The results from our 
empirical analyses suggest that these concerns are not taken out of thin air. Favoritism in procurement is a 
worrying fact.  
Our findings are not only relevant for political scientists, economists and others interested in 
distributive politics, but have implications for the theory undergirding the drive to increase governments 
buying goods and services rather than producing them internally. Scholars have pointed out that the 
efficiency of outside production might be hampered by quality-shading, which is possible because of the 
producer’s information advantage (Hart et al. 1997). Our paper suggests that political factors have similar 
impeding effects, because they incentivize both buyers and sellers to overlook the very reason for 
procurement and instead spend common resources tactically. However, the paper also implies that there is an 
institutional cure for the worst tendencies of tactical spending. Agency designs that limit the direct influence 
of the president and his party in the day-to-day operations of the agency may reduce incentives for tactical 
spending and thereby drive down favoritism in procurement. For example, political appointees in managerial 
positions such as a bureau chief and division head or in positions directly involved in the procurement 
process (e.g., Assistant Secretary for Administration) should probably be avoided. 
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 Appendix A 
In addition to our main regression analyses, we also carry out propensity score matching 
analysis, taking politicized agencies as treated and less politicized agencies as a control group (Table 
A1). Matching removes most of the imbalance between the treatment and the control groups on key 
observable characteristics as evidenced by the median bias decreasing from 68 in the unmatched 
sample to only 8.1 in the matched sample (Table A2), making our comparison of group averages a 
good approximation of the causal effect of agency politicization.  
 
TABLE A1, MATSCHING RESULTS FOR MAIN EFFECT ON NON-COMPARATIVE PROCEDURE AND 
OUTCOME (FOLLOWING MODEL 3 IN TABLE 2) 
  
Raw 
comparison Matching 
Matching: no 
defence 
Control (Indep. Admin. And Indep. Com..) 32.8% 33.1% 33.1% 
Treatment (Executive Dept., incl. Bureau) 35.1% 41.4% 41.9% 
Diff. (treatment - control) 2.3% 8.3% 8.8% 
95% C.I. - lower bound 1.9% 7.8% 8.2% 
95% C.I. - upper bound 2.7% 8.9% 9.3% 
N control 64,05 60,701 60,701 
N treatment 481,665 60,701 60,701 
Matching variables 
Contract Sector N Y Y 
Contract value N Y Y 
Agency Office: State N Y Y 
Agency size: no. of contracts awarded N Y Y 
Agency size: no. of full time employees N Y Y 
Agency: no. of contracting officers N Y Y 
Agency: no. of SES contracting officers N Y Y 
Agency: Any SES contracting officers (Y/N) N Y Y 
 
 
TABLE A2, GOODNESS OF MATCHING STATISTICS   
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p > chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias B R %Var 
Unmatched 0.207 78591.75 0.000 65.5 68.0 138.0* 24.12* 80 
Matched 0.102 17089.47 0.000 12.8 8.1 81.3* 1.32 100 
 
 
  
  
Appendix B 
The separate matching exercises for the 3 periods considerably decrease the imbalance across 
the control and treatment groups on observables. In each case the media bias is cut into 1/5th-1/10th 
after matching is performed (Table B1-B3), even though some limited bias remains even after 
matching. 
 
TABLE B1, GOODNESS OF MATCHING STATISTICS: LAST YEAR OF THE BUSH PRESIDENCY 
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p > chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias B R %Var 
Unmatched 0.319 10864.68 0.000 98.9 109.6 194.5* 6.37* 100 
Matched 0.126 1794.50 0.000 12.9 9.1 89.1* 0.70 100 
 
 
TABLE B2, GOODNESS OF MATCHING STATISTICS: FIRST YEAR OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p > chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias B R %Var 
Unmatched 0.310 11627.06 0.000 90.5 99.1 179.1* 6.96* 100 
Matched 0.094 1527.27 0.000 20.2 22.7 75.7* 0.49* 83 
 
TABLE B3, GOODNESS OF MATCHING STATISTICS: LAST YEAR OF THE OBAMA PRESIDENCY 
Sample Ps R2 LR chi2 p > chi2 Mean Bias Med. Bias B R %Var 
Unmatched 0.201 6918.46 0.000 65.8 70.1 137.7* 21.18* 100 
Matched 0.204 2901.36 0.000 16.7 9.9 123.4* 1.24 80 
 
 
  
 Appendix C 
As the number of appointees’ fluctuation over time can be measured in a number of ways, 
none of which is conceptually much better than the others, we rerun our main analysis using a few 
alternative measures such as appointee percentage’s relative deviation from period average, and 
whether the appointee percentage is above agency average or not.  
 
TABLE C1, ALTERNATIVE POLITICIZATION MEASURES. APPOINTEE PERCENTAGE AND NON-
COMPETITIVE PROCESSES AND SINGLE BID OUTCOMES IN FEDERAL PROCUREMENT, 2003-2015  
  
Single bidder contract & 
non-competitive procedure 
= 1 
 (1) (2) 
Baseline (Agency type): Indep. Com. & Independent Reg. Com.   
Agency type: Independent Administration -0.185 0.347 
Agency type: Executive Department (Bureau) -0.286 0.0495 
Agency type: Executive Dept. (Not Bureau) -0.140 0.482 
Appointee% rel. deviation from agency avg.* Indep. Com. & Independent Reg. 
Com. -0.016  
Appointee% relative deviation from agency avg.*Independent Administration -0.113  
Appointee% relative deviation from agency avg.*Exec. department (Bureau) 0.011  
Appointee% relative deviation from agency avg.*Exec. Department (Not 
Bureau) 0.621*** 
 
Appointee% above agency average =1* Indep. Com. & Independent Reg. 
Com.   -0.059 
Appointee% above agency average =1*Independent Administration  -0.199 
Appointee% above agency average =1*Exec. department (Bureau)  0.049 
Appointee% above agency average =1*Exec. Department (Not Bureau)  0.432*** 
Controls 
Contract award year Y Y 
Contract sector Y Y 
Contract value Y Y 
Agency office: state Y Y 
Department FE Y Y 
Department: no. of contracting officers Y Y 
Agency size: no. of contracts awarded Y Y 
Agency size: no. of full time employees Y Y 
Agency: no. of contracting officers Y Y 
Agency: no. of SES contracting officers Y Y 
Agency: any SES contracting officers (Y/N) Y Y 
Constant Y Y 
Observations 412,407 466,181 
Pseudo R2 0.113 0.098 
 Appendix D 
 
Battleground States by Presidential Election, 2000-2016 
 
200016 
AR, FL, IA, MI, MN, MO, NV, NH, NM, OH, OR, PA, TN, WA, WV, WI 
200417 
AR, CO, FL, HI, IA, ME, MN, MO, NV, NH, NJ, NM, OH, OR, PA, WV, WI 
200818 
CO, FL, IN, MO, NV, NH, NM, NC, OH, PA, VA 
201219 
CO, FL, IA, NV, NH, NC, OH, VA, WI 
201620 
CO, FL, IA, MI, NV, NH, NC, OH, PA, VA, WI 
 
  
 
16 http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/info-battleground04-0621print.html 
17 https://www.realclearpolitics.com/bush_vs_kerry_sbys.html 
18 http://www.politico.com/convention/swingstate.html 
19 http://www.politico.com/2012-election/swing-state/ 
20 (http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/donald-trump-hillary-clinton-battleground-states-224025) 
 Appendix E 
Given that contract performance may act as a more precise proxy to political importance of a 
contract, we also repeat the analysis using contract performance location for assigning contracts to 
battleground states, rather than agency location. 
 
TABLE E1. AGENCY POLITICIZATION, ELECTORAL PRESSURES (BATTLEGROUD STATES 
DEFINED BASED ON CONTRACT PERFORMANCE LOCATION), AND FEDERAL PROCUREMENT, 
2003-2015 
  Single bidder contract & non-competitive procedure 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Baseline: Battleground state = 0    
Battleground state = 1 0.122** 0.124**   
Baseline: Independent Com. & Independent Regional Com.    
Independent Administration   -0.012 -0.071 
Executive Dept. (Bureau)  0.856 0.770 
Executive Dept. (Not Bureau)  1.292* 1.168* 
Battleground state * Independent Com. & Independent. Reg. Com.   -0.169 
Battleground state * Independent Admin.   0.034 
Battleground state * Executive Dept. (Bureau)   0.100* 
Battleground state * Executive Dept. (Not Bureau)   0.246*** 
Controls 
Contract Award Year Y Y Y 
Contract Sector Y Y Y 
Contract value Y Y Y 
Agency Office: State Y Y Y 
Dept. FE Y Y N 
Dep.: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of contracts awarded Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of full-time employees Y Y Y 
Agency: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency: no. of SES contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency: any SES contracting officers (Y/N) Y Y Y 
Constant Y Y Y 
Observations 220,015 220,015 220,015 
Pseudo R2 0.134 0.134 0.134 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Binary logistic regression results (standard errors clustered by agency). The main effect of battleground state in 
Model 3 is Battleground state * Executive Dept. (Not Bureau). 
  
 Appendix F 
Table F1 presents estimates from models that regress cost overruns (ratio of final cost to the 
value of the awarded contract) against the non-competitive process and single bid outcomes of the 
contracts in the data. The same controls as in earlier models are included. 
TABLE F, NON-COMPETETIVE PROCESSES, SINGLE BID OUTCOMES AND COST OF FEDERAL 
PROCUREMENT, 2003-2015   
  Cost increase ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) 
BASELINE: Single bidder contract=0    
Single bidder contract = 1 0.0314***     
BASELINE: Non-competitive procedure=0    
Non-competitive procedure = 1  0.0298***  
BASELINE: Single bidder c. & non-competitive proc.=0    
Single bidder contract & non-competitive procedure = 1     0.0325*** 
Controls 
Contract award year Y Y Y 
Contract sector Y Y Y 
Contract value Y Y Y 
Agency office: state Y Y Y 
Department FE Y Y Y 
Department: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of contracts awarded Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of full time employees N Y Y 
Agency: no. of contracting officers N Y Y 
Agency: no. of SES contracting officers N Y Y 
Agency: any SES contracting officers (Y/N) N Y Y 
Constant Y Y Y 
Observations 417,808 432,439 429,767 
Pseudo R2 0.186 0.253 0.238 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Ordinary least squares regression results (standard errors clustered by agency). 
  
 Appendix G 
One could argue that defense agencies and spending are fundamentally different from the rest 
of the federal government as they are underpinned by a handful of agencies giving out a very large 
proportion of all contacts (48%), and this might bias the average effects we aim to identify. To 
counter such potential biases, we rerun the models in appendix F excluding defense agencies.  
 
TABLE G1, NON-COMPETITIVE PROCESSES, SINGLE BID OUTCOMES AND COST OF FEDERAL 
PROCUREMENT, 2003-2015, DEFENCE CONTRACTS EXCLUDED 
  Cost increase ratio 
 (1) (2) (3) 
BASELINE: Single bidder contract=0    
Single bidder contract = 1 0.0624***     
BASELINE: Non-competitive procedure=0    
Non-competitive procedure = 1  0.0598***  
BASELINE: Single bidder c. & non-competitive proc.=0    
Single bidder contract & non-competitive procedure = 1     0.066*** 
Controls 
Contract award year Y Y Y 
Contract sector Y Y Y 
Contract value Y Y Y 
Agency office: state Y Y Y 
Department FE Y Y Y 
Department: no. of contracting officers Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of contracts awarded Y Y Y 
Agency size: no. of full time employees N Y Y 
Agency: no. of contracting officers N Y Y 
Agency: no. of SES contracting officers N Y Y 
Agency: any SES contracting officers (Y/N) N Y Y 
Constant Y Y Y 
Observations 180,866 190,629 188,087 
Pseudo R2 0.230 0.323 0.304 
Note: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Ordinary least squares regression results (standard errors clustered by agency). 
 
